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 Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on alternative corporate tax
schemes, employing a rigorous real option methodology which has never
been used to study both liquidation policy and taxation. Diﬀerent tax sys-
tems are considered, according to whether the tax regime is progressive
or ﬂat and losses are deductible or not. The critical liquidation threshold
is derived as a function of interest expenses, the ﬁrm’s driving parameters
and the tax rates and taxation brackets. It is shown that only the adop-
tion of a ﬂat tax plan does not interfere with the ﬁrm’s liquidation policy,
while any progressive tax schedule can slow down or speed up the closure
policy.
Keywords: Corporate debt, default risk, progressive tax, real options.
JEL Code: G3, G32,G33, G12, H2, H32
Acknowledgement: The authors wish to thank the Polo Scientiﬁco Didattico in
Rimini for ﬁnancial support.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the debate among tax policy specialists there is no consensus on the appro-
priate rate structure reforms that should be undertaken. In an open economy,
characterized by interdependencies between national and regional systems, in-
tegration becomes more diﬃcult both by progressivity in income taxation and
by the diﬀerential tax treatment of diﬀerent types of assets. The choice of a
tax scheme involves careful evaluation about its economic impact in terms of
eﬃciency and the incentive consequences of marginal tax rates. In several im-
portant contributions (see Sørensen 1998) it has been argued that the Nordic
tax system - based on a dual income tax regime, in which all sources of asset
income are taxed at a common rate - avoids the distortions and improves ef-
ﬁciency. The recent experience of numerous countries adopting a ﬂat tax has
renewed the debate among the advocates and detractors of proportional tax-
ation (see Grecu 2004). A ﬂat income tax applies the same tax rate to all
tax-payers and to each income component. Without personal exemptions the
tax is proportional, with personal exemptions it becomes progressive, so that
taxation increases with income although marginal taxation remains constant.
In 1994 Estonia introduced a ﬂat tax on personal and corporate income at a
rate of 26%, now at 23%. Latvia and Lithuania followed suit. In 2001 Russia
uniﬁed its marginal rates of personal income taxation at a single rate of 13%.
Various reforms applying ﬂat taxation have been followed in 2003 in Serbia (now
at a 14% rate), Ukraine (25%), Slovakia (19%), then in 2005 in Georgia (20%)
and Romania (16%) and ﬁnally in Bulgaria, which is now the European country
with the lowest tax rate (10%). Reforms are considered also in Belarus, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Poland and in countries in Latin America, where the debate
1has played itself out again and again. Ivanova, Keen and Klemm (2005) pro-
vide a most interesting discussion of recent ﬂat tax proposals. The gist of it
is that the Russian reform, by producing an increase in revenue of about 26%
and being accompanied by a strong enforcement policy, has worked quite well.
Given the importance of these inﬂuential reforms, it is worthy to provide a clear
assessment of the eﬀects of alternative taxation rules. The purpose of this paper
is to provide a contribution in this debate focusing on a speciﬁc issue, that is,
to understand how diﬀerent tax rules aﬀect corporate liquidation policy and
corporate behavior.
Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrated that in a perfect frictionless world
ﬁrms do not have optimal tax-driven capital structure, so that the value of a
ﬁrm with debt is equal to the value of an identical ﬁrm without debt. Yet ﬁrms
do have to trade oﬀ the tax beneﬁts of debt with the cost of ﬁnancial distress
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Myers 1977). As it has been stressed by De An-
gelo and Masulis (1980) and more recently reviewed by Graham (1996, 2003)
and Eckbo (2004), the tax beneﬁt of debt can be crowded out by non-debt tax
shields; moreover, ﬁrms do not always beneﬁt from incremental tax deductions
when taxable income is negative. As a consequence, a careful treatment of the
loss limitation rules is called for together with an appropriate evaluation of tax
and non-tax shields to measure the eﬀective marginal tax rates and to link tax
status with corporate debt policy.
We assume a simple tax structure that includes personal as well as corporate
taxes and where interest expenses are deductible. Our model incorporates both
tax and non-tax based explanations of corporate disinvestment policy, such as
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Moreover, three diﬀerent tax rules are con-
sidered to deal with negative income: (i) no deductibility for losses; (ii) full
loss oﬀset provisions; (iii) asymmetric tax rates for positive or negative tax in-
come. We assume that the ﬁrm’s tax position cannot switch among the diﬀerent
taxation schemes over time. The diﬀerent tax schemes are compared to study
how they aﬀect the ﬁrm’s liquidation trigger. Liquidation usually occurs in the
context of taxable losses. These typically introduce an asymmetry which is ad-
dressed in this paper. If the tax base is smaller than the tax exemption, the
tax-payer gets a payment from the ﬁscal authorities. Such "negative tax" is
maximum under rule (ii), where the tax rate applied for the tax reimbursement
is the same for positive and negative income. However, the tax system typically
provides less than full loss oﬀset, not giving tax refund to investors with negative
current taxable income. Under (iii) the tax system treats positive and negative
income asymmetrically, because two diﬀerent rates are applied for the tax reim-
bursement, with a smaller one for negative income. Finally, the simplest such
asymmetry is rule (i), where the "negative tax" is zero, since the rate for the
tax reimbursement is zero with negative income. Our paper clearly indicates
the consequences of a negative tax base in the light of a proportional and pro-
gressive tax schedule and shows the importance of tax rules with respect to the
choice of the ﬁnancial structure, corporate policies and their implications for
policy-makers’ analysis. While most papers have investigated the impact of tax
rules on investment decisions (see Bettendorf 1996 for international interactions
2and Auerbach 2002 for a thorough survey), our paper deals with corporate liq-
uidation policies. Only a few papers have considered the eﬀect of tax advantage
on a ﬁrm’s liquidation policy (see, for example, Leland 1994, Goldstein, Ju, Le-
land 2001, Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner 1989). Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001)
develop a dynamic model of capital structure, where capital gains are taxed on
accrual, and study the eﬀect of tax advantages to debt when future debt levels
can be increased. However, the taxation scheme they consider is proportional,
while in our paper we model a richer taxation structure, both evaluating pro-
portional vs progressive taxation and incorporating alternative tax rules for the
tax reimbursement against losses. Their paper has some similarity to Graham
(2000), which simulates interest deduction beneﬁts and uses them to estimate
the tax-reducing value of debt, although this latter is numerically based and
does not permit equity holders to choose bankruptcy. In a related paper, Fis-
cher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) formulate a dynamic model that predicts that
the tax beneﬁts to debt are mostly negligible and are an increasing function of
ﬁrm value volatility, although both results are contradicted by Graham’s ﬁnd-
ings.
Our aim is to provide a closed-form solution for debt and equity values and for
the liquidation threshold, which is accomplished throughout the real options ap-
proach we adopt. Real options represent the formal modeling technique which is
more appropriate to serve the purposes of decision making in a dynamic context
under uncertainty. Traditional static approaches are not suitable in the study
of liquidation policies, because of the high uncertainty and costs of irreversible
decisions; moreover, they underestimate the upside potentials of the operational
strategies. Real options methods allow to incorporate all these elements of cor-
porate policy. Within such a methodology we integrate corporate taxation as
well as equity holders’ and debt holders’ individual taxation, extending the use
of this model for decision making and for policy-makers. Indeed, real option
literature has been enriched by taxation only recently to display taxational dis-
tortions of investment decisions (Agliardi 2001, Niemann and Sureth 2004). Our
paper instead applies real option methodology to a liquidation problem. Most
papers in the existing literature assume taxation to be proportional. Our result
compares a ﬂat tax schedule with a progressive tax system, where tax progres-
sion means that the average tax rate increases with the tax base. We prove
that the introduction of tax exemptions or tax credits, which make the mar-
ginal tax rate and the average tax rate unequal, do play a role in determining
disinvestment and may yield ineﬃciency in the liquidation policy, in some cir-
cumstances. We investigate the interplay between the size of the marginal tax
rate and the ﬁscal treatment of gains and losses as determinants of corporate
closure policy and show that only under a "perfect" ﬂat tax system the amount
of the marginal tax rate does not aﬀect the liquidation trigger value.
Our analysis builds on the literature analyzing how capital structure is aﬀected
by the costs due to conﬂicts of interest between equity holders and debt hold-
ers. Conﬂicts between debt holders and equity holders may arise because of
the equity holders’ incentive to invest in risky but poor projects, resulting in a
decrease in the value of the debt. In case of liquidation of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s
3management receives nothing and thus has an incentive to postpone disinvest-
ment even if liquidation is preferred by investors. A larger debt level improves
the liquidation decision because it makes default more likely.
Our work explores the extent to which the taxation rules themselves lead to in-
eﬃcient results, both in terms of unsecured creditors’ claims and welfare losses
to society. Therefore it has public policy implications in that it suggests that
the adoption of a proper tax code might facilitate socially eﬃcient economic
outcomes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model set-up. Sec-
tions 3, 4 and 5 investigate the eﬀect of the diﬀerent corporate tax schemes i),
ii), iii) in details. Section 6 contains a comparative analysis of the corporate
ﬁnancial policy under diﬀerent tax regimes and concludes.
2 The basic model
Let us consider the behavior of a representative ﬁrm whose net operating proﬁt
per period is denoted by V . Assume, as usual in real option analysis, that V
follows the stochastic process dV
V = µdt +σdW,w h e r eW is a standard Brown-
ian motion, µ is a drift term and σ measures the volatility. Let r denote the
risk-free interest rate, with r>µsince we consider the case of falling operating
proﬁts which might trigger closure.
We conﬁne ourselves to the case of a ﬁrm managed by the shareholders, so that
possible conﬂicting eﬀects due to governance mechanisms are ignored in order
to focus on tax eﬀects. The ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by issuing equity and debt. Debt
service consists of a perpetual 1 coupon payment C. If the asset value decreases
to a level V such that the ﬁrm defaults on the coupon payment, then liquida-
tion occurs. Closure is irreversible and the debt holders receive the liquidation
value of the ﬁrm’s stock of capital, net of bankruptcy costs. Let K denote the
liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s stock of capital. Bankruptcy costs are assumed
to be proportional to the liquidation value and let α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, measure the
proportion. If bankruptcy occurs, a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of value is lost because
of bankruptcy costs, leaving debt holders with a reduced value. Debt holders
are senior claimants, while equity holde r sa r el e f tw i t hn o t h i n ga sar e s i d u a l
claim. In what follows we denote by D(V ) and E(V ) the values of the claims of
the debt holders and equity holders. We aim at determining the values of these
claims and the closure threshold V.In the argument below we suppose that V
≥ 0: then, it is implicitly assumed that, whenever our argument fails, such a V
does not exist, that is, the ﬁrm never closes down. Let d(V ) and e(V ) be the
payout policies to debt holders and equity holders, respectively. If τb denotes
the personal tax rate for bond investment income, then the payout policy to
bondholders is d(V )=C(1−τb),i fV> V and d(V )=( 1−α)rK,i fV ≤ V .
Firms may deduct interest payments from corporate taxable income. If bank-
ruptcy is declared corporate payments are made in the following order: interest
1Lewis (1990) argues that taxes are irrelevant to debt maturity choice. Guedes and Opler
(1996) ﬁnd little support for tax-based theories of debt maturity choice.
4payments, corporate tax payments and any residual payments to stockholders.
It is assumed that the net capital gain deduction is ruled out in the tax code,
while some form of net capital losses deduction is retained. In the following
sections we are going to study how diﬀerent tax environment aﬀect the liquida-
tion policy of the ﬁrm. As a consequence, the cash ﬂow to equity holders, e(V ),
will take on diﬀerent expressions, depending on the corporate taxation scheme.
Three corporate taxation rules will be examined, that is: i) no deductibility
for losses, ii) full loss oﬀset provisions, iii) asymmetric tax rate for positive or
negative taxable income. We will assume that the ﬁrm cannot switch among
the diﬀerent taxation regimes over time, but is permanently in one or another.
In this section we develop a basic case which serves as a framework for the sub-
sequent speciﬁcations. For the moment, we abstract from the real expression of
the net (after-tax) cash ﬂow to equity holders and let e(V ) be a generic function
satisfying e(V )=0for V ≤ V and some broad technical assumptions which are
detailed below. In the following sections e(V ) will be specialized according to
the three diﬀerent tax rules mentioned above. Proposition 1 proves an analyt-
ical formula for the values of the debt holders’ and equity holders’ claims and
provides a general rule to determine the liquidation threshold V.Since the ﬁrm
is managed by equity holders who set the debt policy and the closure policy, in
the subsequent analysis V and E(V ) assume diﬀerent expression depending on
the tax environment in which the ﬁrm operates, while the expression for D(V )
remains unchanged and therefore will not be mentioned any more.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists V ≥ 0 such that the ﬁrm closes down
as soon as V reaches the liquidation threshold V .L e te(V ) denote the net (af-
ter taxes) cash ﬂow to equity holders. Assume that e(V ) belongs to L1
loc(R),
e(V )=0for V ≤ V , e(V +) < 0 and limV −→∞ e(V )/V is ﬁnite and nonnega-
tive. Then V satisﬁes the condition:
R +∞
V e(Y )Y −1−λ+
dY =0 (1)
where λ
± are the roots of the characteristic equation σ2λ
2+(2µ−σ2)λ−2r =0 ,
λ
− < 0 <λ
+. Moreover, the values of the debt holders’ and equity holders’



















V λ− R V
V e(Y )Y −1−λ−
dY + V λ+ R +∞




=0 forV ≤ V (2)
5Proof. Following the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) framework we see that
the equity holders’ claim E(V ) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation for
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+ are the solutions to σ2λ
2+(2µ−σ2)λ−2r =0 ,λ
− < 0 <λ
+.
In view of the no-bubble condition for V −→ ∞ we have H2 =0 .F i n a l l y w e
apply the smooth-pasting conditions E(V )=0and d
dV E(V )=0 . Combining
the two equations we get H1 =0and we ﬁnd that the optimal closure threshold
satisﬁes (1). Then the equity holders’ claim can be written as (2), where V
satisﬁes the condition (1). The value D(V ) of a claim on the payout policy to
the bondholders d(V ) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation for V> V :
1
2σ2V 2 d2D
dV 2 + µV dD
dV + C(1 − τb)=rD
whose general solution is
C(1−τb)
r + f H1V λ−
, if we take the no-bubble condition
limV →∞ D(V )=
C(1−τb)
r into account. Then f H1 is determined employing the
boundary condition D(V )=( 1− α)K.I fV< V ,t h e nD(V )=( 1− α)K +
f H2V λ+
,w h e r ef H2 =0in view of the pasting condition D(V +) = D0(V −).
Observe that (V
V )λ−
has the interpretation of a measure of the probability
of bankruptcy. Thus, the value of the debt is the sum of the face value of the
debt multiplied by the probability that the ﬁrm is solvent and the expected
net liquidation value at bankruptcy. The expression of the value of equity will
become clearer in the following sections, where the basic model is specialized to
diﬀerent tax schemes as regards the taxation on corporate gain or losses.
3 The case of no deductibility for losses
Let us consider the following taxation regime, including both personal and cor-
porate taxes. Let τe be the personal tax rate for stock investment income and τc
the marginal corporate tax. We allow corporate taxation to be progressive and
model tax progression by means of an exogenously given tax exemption thresh-
old x ≥ 0. If x>0 at least two tax brackets are included in the taxation scheme
and thus the corporate taxation is progressive, because, due to tax exemption,
the average tax rate increases with the tax base even if the marginal tax rate
is constant. Alternatively φc = τcx may be interpreted as a ﬁxed tax credit,
thereby inducing an element of indirect progressivity. In this section we assume
that the tax system gives no tax refund to those investors with negative current
taxable income, that is, we conﬁne ourselves to the case of no deductibility for
6losses. For brevity’s sake, this tax rule is referred to as "ND". Therefore, the
after-tax cash ﬂow to equity holders is:
e(V )= ( V −C−τc max(V −C−x,0))(1−τe) if V > V ("ND")
=0 if V ≤ V
where V denotes the ﬁrm’s liquidation trigger value. The expression of the
payout policy above implements a mark-to market taxation rule. That is, in
each period, capital gains are taxed as accrued even though they are not realized,
like most papers where income is taxed continuously (see Fischer, Heinkel and
Zechner 1989, Goldstein, Ju and Leland 2001, Auerbach 2002). The following
proposition holds:
Proposition 2 Under the corporate taxation scheme "ND" the closure thresh-




























































.(1 − τe) if V ≥ C + x.
Proof. In view of Proposition 1 the closure threshold is obtained solving
the following equation for V :
R +∞
V (Y − C − τc max(Y − C − x,0))Y −1−λ+
dY =0
Working out this expression when e(V) is given by ("ND") we obtain that V is
as o l u t i o nt o V
1−λ+





λ+(1−λ+) =0,w i t hV ≤ C + x.L e tf(V )
denote the left-hand side of this equation. Since f(0+) = +∞, limV −→∞ f(V ) >
0 and f has a negative minimum in C, then the equation f(V )=0admits
two solutions. Only the solution less than C is compatible with the condition
V ≤ C + x. Finally, in view of Proposition 1, the following expression for the
equity holders’ claim obtains:
2(1−τe)
σ2(λ+−λ−)(V λ− R V
V (Y − C − τc max(Y − C −
x,0))Y −1−λ−
dY + V λ+ R +∞
V (Y − C − τc max(Y − C − x,0))Y −1−λ+
dY)
which yields our ﬁnal expression for E(V ).
7Let us now investigate the eﬀect of this form of taxation on the liquidation
decision. First denote the closure threshold in absence of taxation by V 0





λ+ that can also be written in the form −λ−C
1−λ−
r−µ
r ,a si nA g l i a r d i
and Agliardi (2007). With the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 2 we
note that f(V ) < 0 for any V  ]V,C[ and f(V ) > 0 for any V  ]0,V [. Therefore
from f(V 0
0 ) > 0 we get V 0
0 < V . Furthermore the following estimates hold:
∂V
∂τc > 0, ∂V
∂x < 0 and ∂V
∂C > 0. We can paraphrase these results in the following
Corollary ND:
Corollary ND. (i) The introduction of a corporate taxation "ND" speeds
up closure; (ii) the eﬀect is emphasized by a higher marginal rate, while the
presence of tax exemption brackets has a dampening eﬀect; (iii) debt speeds up
closure.
Policy implications. Under "ND" policy-makers aiming at reducing the
occurrence of bankruptcy should either reduce the marginal tax rate or introduce
larger tax exemption brackets.
4F u l l l o s s o ﬀset provision
In this section we study almost opposite tax rules providing tax beneﬁts for
ﬁrms with losses and no limit deductions for interest. If these deduction induce
negative taxable income, the tax system provides tax refunds. We consider a
tax system providing symmetric treatments of positive and negative earnings
after interest. In the previous section the simplest case of tax asymmetry - no
deductibility for losses - has been analyzed, while next section will consider an
intermediate case.
With the same notation as in the previous section we write down the after-tax
payoﬀ to equity holders as follows:
e(V )=( ( V −C)(1−τc)+xτc)(1−τe) if V > V ("FD")
=0 if V ≤ V
where V denotes the ﬁrm’s liquidation trigger value. Such a tax system will be
shortly denoted by "FD" (full deductibility). Note that the presence of x>0
induces a progressive taxation, while for x =0the tax scheme is genuinely
proportional. Thus, this case is the most helpful to highlight the diﬀerent impact
of progressive versus ﬂat taxation. Applying Proposition 1 to this case we
obtain:
8Proposition 3 Under the tax system "FD" and whenever C ≥ τcx
1−τc there







the value of the shareholders’ claim for V> V is given by:
E(V )=
(1−τc)(1−τe)




r (1 − (V
V )λ−
)
Observe that, if xc >C ( 1
τc − 1) ,t h e nV< 0, that is, in presence of
suﬃciently large tax exemptions the ﬁrm never closes. Anyway V< V 0
0 ,w h e r e
V 0
0 is the closure threshold in absence of taxation. In more intuitive terms, the
introduction of taxation "FD" slows down closure. Importantly, V 0
0 equals also
the liquidation threshold when no tax exemption bracket is provided for by the
tax code, that is, when x =0 . Finally, we observe that V increases with C.
Therefore, the following Corollary FD holds:
Corollary FD. (i) Under regime FD the closure policy is unaﬀected by
a proportional tax plan, that is, the closure threshold V 0
0 remains the same,
however high may be the marginal tax rate; (ii) on the contrary, the adoption
of a progressive tax does interfere with the ﬁrm’s liquidation policy, resulting in
ineﬃciently later closure; (iii) debt speeds up closure.
Policy implications. A neutral policy toward corporate liquidation requires
a ﬂat tax combined with full deductibility. A progressive tax plan always gen-
erates ineﬃciency in terms of welfare, since it induces a delayed closure and
reduces the value of the debt holders’ claim in liquidation.
5 Asymmetric treatment of positive or negative
taxable income
In Section 4 we assumed implicitly that interest payments be deductible at the
corporate rate regardless of their magnitude. On the other hand, in Section
3, we limited deductions for interest to the extent that these deductions would
yield positive taxable income. In this section we take an intermediate view, by
supposing that the tax code treats positive and negative taxable income values
asymmetrically, that is the corporate tax rate is τc for positive tax base and
τ∗
c for negative ones, with 0 <τ ∗
c <τ c.T os t u d yt h ee ﬀect of tax progression
we introduce two tax brackets for positive tax base and denote the threshold
between them by x. Symmetrically, we consider a level x∗ ≤ x, such that
a refund (at the rate τ∗
c) applies whenever income falls below it. Generally,
x∗ =0 .I n t h e c a s e x∗ < 0 we conﬁne ourselves to C + x∗ > 0,t h a ti s ,a
limit is set on interest deduction that is used to oﬀset poor corporate income.
Adopting the same notation as in the previous sections, the after-tax payoﬀ to
equity holders is written as follows
9e(V )=( V −C)−τc max(V −C−x,0)+τ∗
c max(V −C−x,0) if V > V
=0 if V ≤ V
where V denotes the ﬁrm’s liquidation trigger value. To avoid complication,
the personal tax rate for stock investment income, τe, has been omitted in this
Section. This tax system will be shortly denoted by "AS" (Asymmetry).
In view of Proposition 1 the corporate liquidation threshold is determined
















In the sequel we distinguish two cases x∗ ≶ C(1/τ∗
c − 1). Let g(V ) denote the
left-hand side of this equation. If x∗ ≥ C(1/τ∗
c−1),t h e ng increases from −∞ to








∂τc < 0, ∂V
∂x > 0, ∂V
∂τ∗
c > 0, ∂V
∂x∗ > 0. If x∗ <C (1/τ∗
c − 1),t h e ng has




c and (3) always admits a solution V.The sign
of the derivatives of V is reversed with respect to the previous case.
Proposition 4 Under the corporate taxation scheme "AS" the closure threshold
is a solution V ≤ C+x∗ to the equation (3). As far as the impact of taxation on
the liquidation policy is concerned, this case splits into two subcases depending
on x∗ ≶ C(1/τ∗
c − 1). If x∗ ≥ C(1/τ∗
c − 1) then tax beneﬁts speed up closure,
while a high tax rate slows down closure, that is, the behavior is like in "FD".
If x∗ <C (1/τ∗
c − 1) then tax beneﬁts slow down closure, while a high tax rate
speeds up closure, as in "ND".
Note that the tax system "ND" can be obtained as a limit case of "AS" letting
τ∗
c → 0. On the other hand, if τ∗
c → τc and x∗ = x, then "AS" boils down to
"FD".















































































































] if C + x<V .
10Policy implications. Proposition 4 shows how an appropriate combination
of marginal tax rates and tax refunds should be used by policy-makers either to
promote or to restrain the event of liquidation.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In order to compare the eﬀects of the diﬀerent taxation regimes a numerical
simulation is performed. In the basic model we take r =4 % , µ =2 % , σ =3 0 % ,
α =5 % , τc = 33%, τ∗
c = 10%, τb =1 2 ,5%. Table 1 reports numerical results.
Simulated values No tax ND FD AS
V/ V 0.41 0.50 0.33 0.47
recovery rate 43% 47% 39% 46%
Table 1
First, observe that the behavior of V is in keeping with the ﬁndings of
Sections 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, notice that bondholders receive a maximum
percentage of debt value upon liquidation under regime ND and that they are
mostly guaranteed by tax plans allowing no tax refund in case of poor corporate
performance. The recovery rate is the lowest under regime FD because of de-
layed closure which reduces the value of the ﬁrm. Note that, however, if the tax
is ﬂat the recovery rate is the same as in the no tax case. Indeed, in view of (3)
the liquidation trigger V remains stuck in V 0
0 , which is the liquidation threshold
in absence of taxation, if and only if τ∗
c = τc and x∗ = x, that is, only under a
truly ﬂat tax scheme. We conclude that only a ﬂat tax plan does not interfere
with liquidation, provided that the regime designs symmetric treatment of gain
and losses like FD. In fact, a ﬂat tax with a diﬀerent regime would change the
liquidation threshold. Supporters of ﬂat tax plans must be aware of the crucial
role of the diﬀerent rules about deductibility. Another conclusion one can draw
from this paper is that policy-makers can modulate progressivity, tax beneﬁts,
rules on deductibility in case of losses, to achieve their objectives, whether they
aim at protecting bondholders or at delaying the closure of a ﬁrm, for example
in presence of a reorganization plan for declining industries.
In the debate among tax policy specialists there is no consensus on the ap-
propriate rate structure reforms that should be undertaken. Our paper provides
a further contribution in this debate on the speciﬁc issue of corporate liquida-
tion policies illustrating both the eﬀects of a progressive vs proportional tax
rate with diﬀerent tax rules and providing precise policy prescriptions.
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